We present a lab-field experiment designed to systematically assess the external validity of social preferences elicited in a variety of experimental games. We do this by comparing behavior in the different games with several behaviors elicited in the field and with self-reported behaviors exhibited in the past, using the same sample of participants. Our results show that the experimental social preference games do a poor job explaining both social behaviors in the field and social behaviors from the past.
Introduction
The last few decades have seen a strong surge of interest in what are now widely known in economics as 'social preferences'. While the study of social behaviors has a long tradition in disciplines like economics (e.g., Smith 1759), psychology (e.g., Triplett 1898; Lewin 1939) and sociology (e.g., Durkheim 1893), in recent times, the term 'social preferences' has come to be associated with a more specific program of research originating mainly in experimental and behavioral economics (see e.g., Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Andreoni 1988; Forsythe et al. 1994; Camerer and Thaler 1995; Gachter 2000, 2002; Charness and Rabin 2002; Fischbacher and Gachter 2010) .
A key feature of this research program is that it has focused largely on the study of experimental games designed to target different aspects of social behavior, such as altruism (e.g., Forsythe et al. 1994; Andreoni and Miller 2002) , reciprocity (e.g., Berg et al. 1995; Cox 2004) and trust (e.g., Berg et al. 1995; Ortmann et al. 2000) . In a typical study, participants play these games in laboratory settings, where special care is taken to strip the games from contextual features that depart from the underlying game-theoretic structures on which they are based, and to provide real monetary incentives that are aligned with the payoffs of the games. This stylized approach has arguably become one of the building blocks of experimental and behavioral economics, with literally thousands of studies published on the topic, some of which are among the most widely cited papers in leading journals (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Gachter 2000, 2002; Henrich et al. 2001 Henrich et al. , 2005 Charness and Rabin 2002; Herrmann, Thoni, and Gachter 2008) . 1 Given such a major interest in the topic, it is surprising how little work has been done to investigate systematically the external validity of this experimental games approach to social preferences. This seems to us to be one of the most fundamental questions yet to be answered about the social preference paradigm. Specifically, to what extent do experimental social preference games tap into the principles governing social behavior when it is put in context or taken outside the lab? Not addressing this question in a systematic way could put social preference research at risk of becoming research on how people play certain games in the lab, instead of research on how people behave in social situations of broader interest to economics and other social and behavioral sciences.
A few researchers have previously warned about potential issues of external validity in research on social preferences (see List 2007a, b, 2008; List 2009 ). In a particularly prominent paper, Levitt and List (2007a) discuss six potential complications that may arise when the findings of social preference experiments are extrapolated outside the lab: (i) participants in the lab act under the scrutiny of the experimenters; (ii) their decisions and actions are unlikely to remain anonymous; (iii) the context matters and cannot be completely controlled by the experimenters; (iv) the stakes are different from the ones in real life; (v) the participants in experiments differ from the groups of people engaged in most real-world behaviors; and (vi) there are artificial restrictions on choice sets and time horizons.
Some of the points raised by Levitt and List can be interpreted as general limitations of laboratory experimentation compared to field settings, and they have in fact initiated a broadranging methodological debate on the scope and limitations of laboratory experiments in economics (see also Falk and Heckman 2009; Camerer 2011) . In that sense, it is important to clarify that our focus here is not on the external validity of laboratory experimentation as a whole, which is in our view not only useful but also necessary in the social and behavioral sciences. We center exclusively on the more specific issue of the external validity of experimental social preference games.
There has indeed been extensive research on some of the complications identified by Levitt and List in the realm of social preferences, including studies on the effects of anonymity and scrutiny (Hoffman et al. 1994, Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Dana, Cain, and Dawes 2006; Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007; List 2007; Bardsley 2008; Franzen and Pointer 2012; Winking and Mizer 2013) ; the context and framing (Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002; List 2006; Branas-Garza 2007; Stoop, Noussair, and van Soest 2012; Stoop 2013) ; the size of the stakes (Slonim and Roth 1998; Cameron 1999; Munier and Zaharia 2003; Carpenter, Verhoogen, and Burks 2005; List and Cherry 2008) ; the subject pool (Gachter, Herrmann, and Thoni, 2004; List 2004 List , 2006 Carpenter and Seki 2005; Bellemare and Kroger 2007; Bellemare, Kroger, and van Soest, 2008; Carpenter, Connolly, and Myers 2008; Garbarino and Slonim 2009; Stoop et al. 2012; Cleave, Nikiforakis, and Slonim 2013; Exadaktylos, Espin, and Branas-Garza 2013; Stoop 2013) ; and the self-selection into lab experiments (Krawczyk 2011; Falk, Meier, and Zehnder 2013; Slonim et al. 2013; Abeler and Nosenzo forthcoming) .
All these factors have been shown to matter, at least in some cases, which calls into question the idea that behavior in experimental social preference games can be immediately representative of social behavior outside the lab. The role of the context is perhaps especially problematic, given that typical social preference games are meant to be as context-free as possible, while much research in experimental economics and psychology has shown that preferences seem to be significantly shaped by the context in which they are elicited (see, e.g., Slovic 1995; Loewenstein 1999; Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2006; Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006; Stewart, Reimers, and Harris forthcoming) .
More closely related to the research presented here are a relatively small number of empirical studies that have examined the external validity of experimental social preference games by directly linking evidence from the lab and the field for the same pool of subjects (Glaeser et al. 2000; Castillo and Carter 2002; Fehr et al. 2003; Gachter, Herrmann, and Thoni, 2004; Cardenas and Carpenter 2005; Holm and Danielson 2005; Karlan 2005; Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov, 2006; Bellemare and Kroger, 2007; Ruffle and Sosis 2007; Benz and Meier 2008; Laury and Taylor 2008; Barr and Serneels 2009; Baran, Sapienza, and Zingales 2010; Barr and Zeitlin 2010; Carpenter and Myers 2010; Englmaier and Gebhardt 2010; Rustagi, Engel, and Kosfeld 2010; Serra, Serneels, and Barr 2010; Carpenter and Seki, 2011; de Oliveira, Croson, and Eckel 2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011; Lamba and Mace 2011; Voors et al. 2011 Voors et al. , 2012 Leibbrandt 2012; Cardenas, Chong, and Nopo 2013; Franzen and Pointer 2013; Barr, Packard, and Serra, 2014; Bernold et al. 2014) .
2 Table 1 provides a synoptic summary of these lab-field studies, ordered chronologically.
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As Table 1 shows, the accumulated evidence is somewhat mixed. Some studies have found significant correlations between behavior in particular experimental games and specific field behaviors (Englmaier and Gebhardt 2010; Rustagi et al. 2010; Serra et al. 2010; Carpenter and Seki 2011; de Oliveira et al. 2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011; Leibbrandt 2012) ; some others have found no correlation (Bellemare and Kroger, 2007; Bouma, Bulte, and van Soest 2008; Lamba and Mace 2011; Voors et al. 2011 Voors et al. , 2012 Bernold et al. 2014) ; and many have obtained mixed findings (Glaeser et al. 2000; Castillo and Carter 2002; Fehr et al. 2003; Gachter, Herrmann, and Thoni, 2004; Cardenas and Carpenter 2005; Holm and Danielson 2005; Karlan 2005; Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov, 2006; Ruffle and Sosis 2007; Benz and Meier 2008; Laury and Taylor 2008; Barr and Serneels 2009; Barr and Zeitlin 2010; Carpenter and Myers 2010; Cardenas et al. 2013; Franzen and Pointer 2013; Barr, Packard, and Serra, 2014) .
In terms of the number of studies, the balance seems to be on the side of the ones reporting at least some significant correlation, but the interpretation of this is unclear. This imbalance could reflect the well-known bias to submit and publish significant results over insignificant ones, and could thus overrepresent spurious correlations (see, e.g., Rosenthal 1979; Miguel et al. 2014; Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons 2014) . In addition, the near impossibility of establishing a strict one-to-one correspondence between context-free experimental games and field settings could sharpen the bias against publication of nonsignificant findings.
For these reasons, a major shortcoming of the evidence available to date is that most of the studies are not systematic. They typically report some relationship between one experimental game and one field behavior, leaving us wondering what a more systematic comparison of games against field situations would reveal.
In this paper, we present a systematic investigation of the external validity of social preference games, conducted by comparing behavior in a variety of games with a variety of situations created in the field, and also with self-reported social behaviors performed in the past, all using the same sample of participants. The different social preference games included (dictator game, ultimatum game, trust game, and public good game) cover a large proportion of experimental research on social preferences; the five different field situations tap into different types of pro-social behaviors related to giving money and helping others; and the self-report measures include various pro-social tendencies shown in the past.
Rather than trying to establish one-to-one correspondence between particular experimental games and specific field situations, which is necessarily imprecise given the context-free nature of the games, we adopt the strategy of covering a variety of prominent social preference games and a variety of relevant field behaviors to explore more broadly the extent to which the games are predictive of social behaviors shown in the field. The relationship between the games and field situations we studied is further discussed in the next sections. The self-report measures of past social behaviors provide an additional layer to evaluate the explanatory ability of the games. To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the most systematic and comprehensive study of the external validity of experimental social preference games available to date.
Our results show that the social preference games do a poor job explaining both the field behaviors and the self-reports. In a nutshell, none of the behaviors elicited in the field or reported from the past were explained to a significant extent by behavior in the experimental games. We do not claim that this single study can establish any firm or final conclusions about the complex issue of the external validity of social preferences games. We do believe, however, that our results are worrying and they call for more, and more systematic, research on this important issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methods used; Section 3 presents the results obtained; Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
Methods
Our general approach to investigate the external validity of social preference games involved presenting the same sample of participants with the following three elements: (i) a set of questions about social behaviors exhibited in the past; (ii) a variety of social preference games played in the laboratory; and (iii) several naturalistic situations related to social preferences that we created in the field. The main aim of this design was to evaluate the social preference games against actual social behaviors in the field and self-reported social behaviors from the past, all using the same individuals.
This lab-field set-up was organized so that each individual participated in three separate sessions on three different days of the same week. On the first day, the participants came into the lab to do different tasks (some of them unrelated to social preferences), which included the self-report measures of past social behaviors. On the second day, the same participants played various social preference games in the lab. On the third day, they came again to the lab to complete a task that was unrelated to social preferences, and after exiting they were faced with an opportunity to behave pro-socially in one of five field situations.
This three-day lab-field structure allowed us to obtain all the information that we were interested in, while minimizing the possibility of cross-contamination between the different tasks. We now explain each one of these three main components in turn.
Session 1: The self-reported measures of past social behaviors
In the first experimental session of the week, upon their arrival to the lab, the participants were assigned anonymous ID codes. They were then asked to read an informed consent form and sign it if they agreed to carry on with the experiment. The form reiterated important information that they had already seen on the invitation email. Specifically, it said that: the experiment would require coming to the lab for three separate sessions on three different days of the week; each session would last about one hour; they would receive a fixed amount of £30 for their participation in all three sessions (to be paid at the end of the last session); and they would have the opportunity to get an extra payment depending on their performance in the tasks. The participants were then randomly assigned to different cubicles in the lab. Throughout the session, they were given more specific instructions for the different tasks. 4 In Session 1, the participants reported on their past pro-social behaviors using the SelfReport Altruism (SRA) Scale (Rushton, Chrisjohn, and Fekken 1981) . This scale consists of 20 items, in which people are asked to state how frequently in the past they have done different actions related to pro-social behaviors. Three examples are: "I have given money to a charity", "I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (books, parcels, etc.)", and "I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it)". A full list of the 20 SRA items is contained in Appendix A. Participants rated each statement on a scale from 1 ("never") to 5 ("very often"). This constitutes our primary measure of past pro-social behaviors.
In addition to the SRA scale, in Session 1, the participants responded to other questionnaires (not part of the present study) and they completed another unrelated task, which consisted of watching and rating several videos.
Session 2: The social preference games
In Session 2, the subjects returned to the lab, were again assigned individual ID codes and randomly allocated to cubicles, and then received more specific and detailed instructions for the tasks they would complete throughout the session. Because of the structure of some of the games played in the session, we needed the number of participants to be a multiple of four. To this end, we allocated the remaining people to a separate task (conducted in a different room and unrelated to this study) for the rest of the session.
In this session, the subjects participated in seven different games (explained in detail below) that are widely used in economics and other social and behavioral sciences to study social preferences. All the games were one-shot (i.e., the subjects only played them once) and independent from each other. In each of the seven games, the participants were randomly matched (anonymously) with other participants in the session, under the constraint that they never interacted with the same person more than once. At the end, one of the seven games was randomly selected and the participants were actually paid the amount they earned in that particular game. All the games were computerized, and they were programmed and implemented using Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) .
Participants first received general instructions on the seven-game structure and the general payment mechanism, followed by specific instructions before each game. All the instructions given to the subjects included examples to illustrate the games and the consequences of playing different strategies, and there was always explicit room for questions.
One aspect of this design that may be worth stressing is that we used only one-shot games. While we acknowledge that repeating some experimental games can show interesting patterns of behavior, we deliberately avoided repetition because one-shot situations better fit our purposes of eliciting social preferences using a variety of games. In particular, this minimizes unwanted cross-contamination effects produced by learning, feedback, income, and reputation building (see, e.g., Goeree and Holt 2001, 2004) . This set-up also makes the games more similar to the one-shot field situations they would face at the end of Session 3. Furthermore, one-shot games have been the focus of most of the previous lab-field studies on the external validity of social preference games (Glaeser et al. 2000; Castillo and Carter 2002; Fehr et al. 2003; Gachter, Herrmann, and Thoni, 2004; Karlan 2005; Ruffle and Sosis 2007; Benz and Meier 2008; Laury and Taylor 2008; Barr and Serneels 2009; Barr and Zeitlin 2010; Carpenter and Myers 2010; Rustagi et al. 2010; Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011; Lamba and Mace 2011; Leibbrandt 2012; de Oliveira et al. 2011; Cardenas et al. 2013; Franzen and Pointner 2013; Barr, Packard, and Serra, 2014; Bernold et al. 2014) .
Our participants were not given information or feedback about the results of the different games until the end, with the exception of the information they inevitably obtained from simply playing the games (i.e., in the case of player 1 in the dictator games and player 2 in the ultimatum and trust games explained below). All the games were played in the order specified below: 1) Dictator Game 1 (DG1): Two-player game in which Player 1 decides how to divide £10 between the self and Player 2. Player 2 simply receives the allocation established by Player 1. Half of the participants were Player 1 and the other half Player 2. 2) Dictator Game 2 (DG2): Like Dictator Game 1, but switching the roles (and matching people with different partners). 3) Ultimatum Game 1 (UG1): Two-player game in which Player 1 decides how to divide £10 between him/her and Player 2. Player 2 decides whether to accept the allocation or not. If the allocation is rejected, both players get nothing. Half of the participants were Player 1 and the other half Player 2.
4) Ultimatum Game 2 (UG2):
Like Ultimatum Game 1, but all the participants were Player 2 and all of them had to respond to the same allocation of £5 for Player 2, which was determined by a participant who was Player 1 in a preliminary pilot session.
5 5) Trust Game 1 (TG1): Two-player game in which Player 1 has an endowment of £10 and decides how much of it to send over to Player 2. The amount sent over is multiplied by three and given to Player 2, who has to decide how much of it to send back to Player 1. Half of the participants were Player 1 and the other half Player 2. 6) Trust Game 2 (TG2): Like Trust Game 1, but all the participants were Player 2 and all of them had to respond to the same amount of £5 sent over by Player 1, which was determined by a participant who was Player 1 in a preliminary pilot session. 7) Public Good Game (PGG): Four-player game in which all the players have an endowment of £10 and have to decide simultaneously how much of it to contribute to a common group fund. The overall money in the group fund is then multiplied by two and split between the four players.
Note that these seven games involve six different decisions per participant, and eight different decisions overall, as follows: (i) Player 1 in DG1 (half of the subjects) or in DG2 (half of the subjects); (ii) Player 1 in UG1 (half of the subjects); (iii) Player 2 in UG1 (half of the subjects); (iv) Player 2 in UG2; (v) Player 1 in TG1 (half of the subjects); (vi) Player 2 in TG1 (half of the subjects); (vii) Player 2 in TG2; and (viii) one of the players in PG. The allocation of participants was arranged so that those who acted as Player 1 in UG1 acted as Player 1 again in TG1, so that those who were Player 2 in UG1 were Player 2 again in TG1. Thus, every participant was Player 1 in a dictator game; Player 2 in an ultimatum and in a trust game with a fixed amount of £5; and one of the players in a public good game. In addition, half the participants were Player 1 in an ultimatum game and in a trust game, and the other half were Player 2 in those games.
These experimental games cover a substantial proportion of research on social preferences and they address many of the main behavioral constructs invoked in the literature to explain social behaviors. Those constructs include: altruism (Player 1 in DG1 and DG2); positive reciprocity (Player 2 in TG1 and TG2); negative reciprocity (Player 2 in UG1 and UG2); anticipation of positive reciprocity (Player 1 in TG1); anticipation of negative reciprocity (Player 1 in UG1); trust (Player 1 in TG1); cooperation (PGG); and inequality aversion (which could be used to explain the behavior of all the players in all the games). This variety of games and behavioral constructs associated with social preferences constitutes 5 One randomly selected participant in Session 2 was then actually matched with that previous participant to determine his/her payoff in the game. This method is a simple way of eliciting Player 2 behaviors in the ultimatum game presenting all the participants with the same situation (instead of having varying offers by Player 1), and it avoids the additional complications of techniques like the strategy method, which would have made the experimental session excessively complex. We used the same method in Trust Game 2 (see below). our benchmark to compare behavior in social preference games to the self-reported social behaviors from the past and to the social behaviors exhibited in the field situations.
Session 3: The field situations
In Session 3, the participants again returned to the lab, were assigned individual ID codes and randomly allocated to their cubicles, and then received more specific and detailed instructions for the task they would complete during the session.
In this session, the participants worked on a single task that was unrelated to the present study. The task consisted of making choices between different consumer products. At the end of the task, the subjects were paid individually the £30 they were entitled to for having participated in the three sessions. The £30 were always paid using exactly the same bill and coin denominations, namely: two £10 bills, one £5 bill, three £1 coins, two 50 pence coins, and five 20 pence coins. This was done to make sure that all the participants had available cash in various denominations before encountering the field situations outside of the lab. We made sure that one participant left the lab approximately every three minutes to allow time for the previous participant to complete the field situation.
When the participants left the laboratory, they encountered one of five several naturalistic field situations that provided an opportunity to behave pro-socially. Two involved helping and the other three involved donating money. The five situations were run consecutively, in the order specified below: 1) Boxes: A research assistant stood in an area outside the lab and told the participants that he needed help carrying two voluminous (but light) boxes to the basement of the university building where the lab was located. He explicitly asked the participants one by one as they exited the lab if they could help. If the participants said yes, they actually helped him carry the boxes downstairs. 2) Phone: A research assistant stood outside the lab and said to the participants that he needed to make a quick phone call but his phone was out of battery. He explicitly asked the participants if they could lend him their phone for a minute to make the call. If the participants lent him the phone, he simply made a call, hung up, and said that there was no answer. 3) Children's Charity: A research assistant stood outside the lab collecting money for a leading charity dedicated to helping children in developing countries. He explicitly asked the participants if they wanted to contribute money to the charity. The research assistant was wearing an official university T-shirt and a professional (sealed) charity bucket of the type commonly used to collect donations, with a large sticker with the logo of the charity. He also had color-printed leaflets with a brief description of the charity and its activities. The money given by people was then actually sent to the charity.
4) Environmental Charity:
This situation was exactly like the previous one, but with a different charity. This organization was a leading charity dedicated to protecting the environment. The money donated was actually sent to the charity. 5) Lab Donation: This situation was analogous to situations 3 and 4, but this time the research assistant was asking for money to support research projects conducted in our lab. The money given by people was actually added to the research funds of the lab.
These different field situations cover a variety of naturalistic environments, in which the participants were able to express their social inclinations. Helping others and giving money to others are actually representative of a large number of real-world circumstances related to social preferences.
We deliberately do not want to establish strict one-to-one correspondence between these field situations and the behavior of specific players in specific games. The context-free nature of the games makes such correspondences necessarily imprecise. Our strategy here is rather to cover a variety of relevant social preference games and a variety of relevant field situations and explore the extent to which the games are predictive of social behaviors in the field.
Nevertheless, the different field situations could be related to some of the behavioral constructs presumably captured by the games, as follows: (i) altruism (in different forms) is likely to be related to decisions in the Box, Phone, and Children's Charity situations; (ii) positive reciprocity is likely to be part of behavior in the Lab Donation situation; (iii) cooperation is likely to be a relevant motive in the Environmental Charity situation, which focuses essentially on a contribution to a public good; and (iv) inequality aversion may be, to some extent, relevant in all the situations, but possibly especially so in Children's Charity.
Participants and sessions
All experimental sessions were conducted at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Behavioural Research Lab (BRL) between June and September 2012. A total of 363 people participated in the experiment in a total of 35 experimental sessions. The participants were volunteers recruited from the BRL subject pool, which comprises about 5,000 people, mostly current and former students of the University of London. We used no other eligibility or exclusion criteria to select participants. All the experimental procedures were approved by the LSE Research Ethics Committee.
Results
The results are presented in four separate sections. We start by describing briefly the results obtained in the three main elements that we elicited (self-reported measures of past social behaviors, social preference games, and field situations). Then (in Section 3.4) we focus on the main research question of the paper, which is the extent to which the games explain the self-report measures and the field behaviors. Figure 1 shows the distribution of total scores obtained by the participants on the SRA Scale. SRA responses are normally combined in one single SRA score, with no multi-factor structure. The means and standard deviations obtained for the different items are shown in Table B1 in Appendix B.
Self-report measures of past social behaviors
As Figure 1 shows, there was a wide variety in the total SRA scores obtained, with more scores concentrated around the center of the distribution and a slight positive skew.
Social preference games
Figures 2a and 2b consist of 4 panels each (Panels A, B, C, and D in Figure 2a , and Panels E, F, G, and H in Figure 2b ), which together show the distribution of responses in the 8 different decisions obtained from the games.
The results are broadly in line with the patterns usually reported in the literature. Panel A shows that 37% of the people acting as Player 1 in DG1 and DG2 gave £0 to Player 2. The rest made contributions greater than £0, with most people giving amounts between £1 and £5, and showing a high 25% spike at £5. Contributions above zero in this type of game are typically interpreted as altruism.
6 Panel B shows a different picture for Player 1 in UG1. In that case, only 3% of the people allocated £0 to Player 2, with most people contributing amounts between £1 and £5, and a high 37% spike at £5. This difference between Panels A and B is typically interpreted as an anticipation of negative reciprocity in Player 2 that could lead him/her to reject small contributions. In Panel C, we can see that 14% of the people acting as Player 2 in UG1 rejected the allocations established by Player 1; the rest of the participants accepted them. This rejection behavior is usually interpreted as negative reciprocity on the side of Player 2. Panel D shows approximately the same percentages as Panel C for the case of Player 2 in UG2.
In Panel E, we find contributions scattered all across the range from £0 to £10 for Player 1 in TG1. The highest bar is at £2 (22 percent), with other bars above 10 percent at £0, £3, £5, and £10. Contributions above zero by Player 1 in this type of game are typically interpreted as an anticipation of positive reciprocity in Player 2 (or trust). In Panel F, we see the amounts sent back by Player 2 in TG1. They show a high spike of 47 percent at £0. The rest of the participants contributed varying amounts across the range from £1 to £15, most of them between £1 and £5. Contributions greater than zero here are typically interpreted as positive reciprocity by Player 2. Panel G shows a very similar pattern for Player 2 in TG2, with slightly fewer people at £0, more people between £1 and £5, and no one at £15. Finally, Panel H shows a tri-modal distribution of contributions in PGG, with two high bars at £0 (21 percent) and £10 (21 percent), and a lower spike at £5 (13 percent). The remaining contributions are scattered across the whole range, with more contributions between £1 and £4 than between £6 and £9. Amounts greater than zero can be interpreted here as cooperative behavior. Table 2 shows all the pairwise correlations (Spearman's ρ) between the different game decisions. The majority of the correlations are statistically significant at the 5 percent level (32 out of 48, removing the correlations between the same variables) and positive (26 out of 32). All the negative correlations involve the behavior of Player 2 in the ultimatum games, reflecting that people who accept allocations in the ultimatum games are more likely to make lower contributions in the other game decisions. Some of the correlations are also relatively high, with 6 of them above 0.4. This shows that there was a relatively high degree of internal consistency in the decisions that the participants made in the games. Figure 3 shows the distribution of behaviors in the five different field situations, organized in five different panels. It also shows an additional Panel F, which displays the three monetary situations together (Children's Charity, Environmental Charity and Lab Donation). The number of participants in each situation, after removing the missing data, was 50 in Boxes, 44 in Phone, 59 in Children's Charity, 73 in Environmental Charity, and 48 in Lab Donation.
Field situations
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As Panel A shows, 88 percent of the participants that faced the Boxes situation helped the research assistant to carry the boxes to the basement, and only 12 percent chose not to help. In Panel B, we see that people were more divided in the Phone situation: 70 percent of the people lent their phones to the research assistant and 30 percent did not. Panel C shows the distribution of contributions in the Children's Charity situation. 42 percent of the participants did not give any money to the charity, and the other 58 percent gave varying amounts between £0.15 and £5, with higher bars at £1 and £2. Panel D shows that 67 percent of the people did not give anything to the Environmental Charity. The other 33 percent gave amounts between £0.05 and £2.10, with a higher spike at £1. Finally, in Panel E, we have the contributions made by the participants in the Lab Donation situation. 50 percent of the people did not give money to the lab, and the other 50 percent contributed amounts between £0.20 and £2.00, with higher bars at £1 and £2.
Do the games explain the past and the field behaviors?
We now turn to the main question of whether the game decisions explain the self-reported measures and the field behaviors. To being with, Table 3 contains pairwise correlations (Spearman's ρ) between the eight game variables and the SRA scores. SRA responses are typically aggregated into one total score (SRAtotal), but to extend the analysis we calculated a second score (SRAmoney), including only the three items related to money (Items 4, 5 and 13). The game variables were then correlated with both scores. Table 3 shows that three of the eight game variables are significantly correlated with total SRA scores at the 5 percent level, and only one of the eight variables is significantly correlated with the monetary SRA score. The significant correlations are relatively low, with no correlation greater than 0.2. The game decisions that correlate significantly with SRA scores are those of Player 1 in DG1 and DG2 (labeled as DG1&2 P.1), Player 2 in TG2 (TG2 P.2), and the players in PGG. This suggests that these correlations with SRA scores may relate to motivations that have to do with altruism, positive reciprocity, or cooperative tendencies, which seems consistent with the types of items included in the SRA Scale. Overall, we interpret this as evidence that there is only a weak relationship between social preference games and SRA responses. Table 4 contains pairwise correlations (Spearman's ρ) between the eight game variables and the five different field behaviors, including one additional field variable that groups together the contributions made in the three situations that had to do with donating money (Children's Charity, Environmental Charity and Lab Donation).
As Table 4 shows, only one of the 48 correlations is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. It is a correlation of 0.54 between TG1 P.1 and behavior in the Children's Charity situation. This is likely to be a spurious correlation, given that it is only one out of 48 and that there is no theoretical reason to expect that this game variable would be correlated with this field situation to a larger extent than some of the other game variables (e.g., DG1&2 P.1). In addition, the correlations within the same variables change from positive to negative with no apparent meaningful pattern, which suggests randomness and a lack of consistent relationships. Overall, we interpret this as evidence that there is no systematic relationship between the game decisions and behavior in the field situations that we analyzed.
To extend these initial correlations, we next present a regression analysis that puts together different game variables in the same models to show how much of the variance in the self-reported measures and the field behaviors is explained by the games. Table 5 contains a summary of the regression results obtained for the SRA scores. The table consists of two columns, one of them for the results using the total SRA scores (SRAtotal) as the dependent variable and the other for the results using only the three items that have to do with money (SRAmoney). The results in each column are obtained from three separate linear (Ordinary Least Squares) regressions with the following entered as explanatory variables: (i) the game decisions in which we have responses from the full sample of participants (DG1&2 P.1, UG2 P.2, TG2 P.2, and PGG); (ii) the decisions made by only one half of the sample (UG1 P.1 and TG1 P.1); and (iii) the decisions made by the other half of the sample (UG1 P.2 and TG1 P.2). The coefficient shown in the table for each variable corresponds to the coefficient obtained for that variable in the corresponding regression. In addition to the coefficients, each column also shows the proportion of variance explained by the explanatory variables in each of the regression models, in the form of R 2 .
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As Table 5 shows, only one variable in the first column and one in the second column appear as statistically significant at the 5 percent level (UG1 P.1 in the first column and TG2 P.2 in the second). In addition, two other variables in the first column of Table 4 (DG1&2 P.1 and TG2 P.2) are significant at the 10 percent level. These results are broadly in line with the correlations reported in Table 3 .
More importantly, the proportions of variance explained by the models in Table 5 are very low. All of them are below 0.07 and most of them are actually very close to zero. We interpret this as evidence that the game variables have a very limited power to explain the SRA scores. Table 6 contains a summary of the regression results obtained for the field behaviors. The table has six columns, corresponding to the five different field situations plus one additional variable that brings together the three situations that have to do with donating money (Children's Charity, Environmental Charity and Lab Donation). Each of the columns is constructed following the same three-regression structure explained for Table 6 with behavior in the field situation as the dependent variable. In the case of the situations with binary dependent variables (Boxes and Phone), the models are standard logistic regressions, and the measures of variance explained correspond to McFadden's Pseudo-R 2 .
The results in Table 6 show that only two out of 48 coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. One corresponds to the only correlation that was significant at the 5 percent in Table 4 (TG1 P.1 in the Children's Charity column), and the other corresponds to a correlation that was significant at the 10 percent level in Table 4 (TG2 P.2 in the Lab Donation column). As mentioned in reference to Table 5 , this statistical significance may well be the result of spurious correlations. Overall, the results in Table 6 are broadly consistent with the correlations reported in Table 4 .
More substantially, the proportions of variance explained by the regression models are again very low. Most of them are below 0.07 (11 out of 18) and many of them are close to zero. The variation in these proportions does not seem to follow any meaningful patterns and may also be the result of randomness. We interpret these results as evidence that the game decisions have a very limited power to explain the field behaviors that have been investigated here. 9 8 Note that the variables used in the second and third regressions in each column could never be included in the same model, because there is no overlap in observations between them. In addition, putting the variables of either of those two regressions together with the variables in the first model would sacrifice half of the observations contained in the sample. 9 The regressions discussed in this section have been further investigated employing a broad range of statistical methods, including: regressions with one game variable at a time, 'stepwise' regressions with game variables added in sequentially, robust standard errors, log-transforming the dependent variables, Tobit models, nonparametric techniques, and two-stage approaches. The main results remain essentially the same across all these
Discussion and conclusions
We have presented the results of a large lab-field experiment that constitutes arguably the most systematic assessment of the external validity of experimental social preference games available to date. In particular, we elicited self-reported social behaviors performed in the past, decisions in seven experimental social preference games, and behaviors in five naturalistic field situations that we created. In this context, we investigated the extent to which the games can explain the self-reported measures and the field behaviors.
The overarching conclusion is that the games do a poor job explaining both the selfreport measures and the field behaviors. It is particularly striking that they do not seem to explain to any significant extent any of the behaviors observed in the field. Our results seem to support the conclusions by Voors et al. (2012) that, in social preference games, "play in lab experiments has no predictive power for behavior in naturally occurring settings" (p. 310); or by Laury and Taylor (2008) that "one should be cautious when using the results from laboratory […] experiments to make inferences about altruism outside the laboratory" (p. 29).
Evaluating the external validity of social preference games is, of course, a vast and difficult task, which requires a full research program and can potentially be tackled in a number of different ways. We do not claim to have established any firm or final conclusions about it with this single paper, but we do believe that our results are worrying and call for more, and more systematic, research on this issue.
We find particularly troubling that most of the available studies that relate behavior in social preference games with field behaviors report only the results of one game and one field situation. This raises serious concerns about the possibility that some of those results are produced by spurious correlations. There is a well-known and strong bias to write up and to publish significant results and not insignificant ones. In this particular case, the bias is likely to be even stronger, because the lack of a clear one-to-one correspondence between experimental games and field situations makes it difficult to justify insignificant results as meaningful.
For these reasons, we believe that more systematic studies investigating the external validity of social preference games are needed. Systematization can be achieved in different ways. The present study compared a variety of games with a variety of field situations and past behaviors using the same sample of participants. This strategy can be extended further in subsequent studies, but there are also other possibilities. One could, for example, compare the patterns observed in reciprocal (or altruistic, or trusting, or cooperative) behavior in the lab with patterns of reciprocal behavior occurring in different field environments (see List 2006; Stoop et al. 2012; Stoop 2013) .
One potential limitation of our approach is that there is (deliberately) no clear theoretical mapping from one specific game to one specific field situation. While we methods, and we have therefore opted to present the results in the simplest and clearest way possible. The outcomes of additional analyses are available from the authors upon request. acknowledge this limitation, we also believe that such a mapping is virtually impossible to achieve with standard social preference games because of their artificiality and lack of context, unless field situations are stylized to be mere replications of the games. Under those circumstances, however, one could not answer the question of whether the games predict social behaviors of any relevance outside the lab.
Another potential response to our results is that the issue of the external validity of social preference games does not really matter. For instance, Camerer (2011) argues that there is "consensus among most experimental economists that realism, generalizability, or external validity are not especially important" (p. 7). While we agree with many of the arguments in Camerer (2011), we respectfully disagree with this specific claim. In our experience, few experimental economists would feel comfortable with the idea that they are merely studying how people play games that have no relevance to the world outside the lab. That is also clearly not the spirit in which experimental results are presented and discussed in academic journals and conferences. We would even venture to say that the interest that most experimental economists (let alone other types of economists) have in economic experiments comes mainly from external validity, in the sense of being able to learn something about human behavior beyond the specific games played in the lab (see arguments along these lines in Roth 1988 Roth , 1995 Davis and Holt 1993; Loewenstein 1999; Starmer 1999a, b; Hertwig and Ortmann 2001; Smith 2002 Smith , 2003 Harrison and List 2004; Bardsley 2005; Guala 2005; Schram 2005; Bardsley et al. 2009; Croson and Gachter 2010) .
We will finish by stressing two important points. First, we do not see our research as addressing any dispute about lab versus field experimentation. As noted by authors like Harrison and List (2004) , List and Levitt (2007b) , Falk and Heckman (2009 ), Camerer (2011 ), or Harrison (2013 , among others, the relationship between lab and field experiments is a symbiotic one, with the two approaches complementing each other. Both lab and field experiments have their own strengths and weaknesses. Lab experiments, for instance, are important because of their ability to tightly control the environment and isolate causal relationships, to closely reproduce conditions of theoretical models, and to replicate past findings. Furthermore, they can provide insights into important behavioral patterns prior to moving into the field (Levitt and List 2007b) . There are indeed countless types of laboratory experiments in the social and behavioral sciences, and many of them have proved to be invaluable in uncovering behavioral principles of relevance for real-world phenomena outside the lab. Thus, our conclusions here are not at all on the adequacy of laboratory experimentation as a whole, but on the external validity of experimental social preference games, which constitute the bedrock of modern research on social preferences in economics and other related disciplines.
Second, we do not see our study as dismissing the important contributions of the literature on social preferences. It is undeniable that the social preference paradigm has provided groundbreaking insights into phenomena like cooperation and punishment (e.g., Henrich et al. 2001; Andreoni and Miller 2002; Gachter 2000, 2002; Herrmann, Thoni, and Gachter 2008) . There is, however, a more specific issue of whether the particular type of lab experimentation being conducted in this paradigm is capturing the actual underpinnings of real-life social behavior, which may have to lead to a revision of some of the experimental methods used in the paradigm.
It may still be too early to say how such a revision should be done, but part of the answer may involve bringing more context into the lab, and constructing experimental environments that more closely resemble naturalistic situations. After all, experimental economics and psychology have widely documented that subtle differences in the context can have profound effects on how people behave (e.g., Ross and Ward 1996; Cherry et al. 2002; Ariely et al. 2006; List 2007; Bardsley 2008; Stewart et al. forthcoming) . As pointed out by Harrison and List (2008) , "it is not the case that abstract, context-free experiments provide more general findings if the context itself is relevant to the performance of the subjects" (p. 840).
16. I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with a homework assignment when my knowledge was greater than his or hers.
17. I have, before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbour's pets or children without being paid for it.
18. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.
19. I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a stranger who was standing. 20. I have helped an acquaintance to move households. "*", "**" and "***" stand for statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. "-" indicates that the correlation cannot be computed because there is no overlap between participants in the pair of variables. 0.20*** 0.15** PGG 0.14** 0.00 Notes: "*", "**" and "***" stand for statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. "*", "**" and "***" stand for statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. 0.00 0.01 Notes: "*", "**" and "***" stand for statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. "*", "**" and "***" stand for statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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